the Labour Market The Finnish Case1)
currency will have implications for the labour market. This was made clear already in
Robert Mundell's (1961) analysis of optimal currency areas. Mundell analysed Friedman's
(1953) argument, that countries with rigid price and wage structures need flexible
exchange rates. Thus, in an optimal currency area, prices and nominal wages must be
flexible and/or the workforce must be mobile.
The price for the monetary stability and
predictability offered by a currency union would thus, according to many economists, be
instability especially in the labour market.
The trade union movement
in Finland questioned this "common wisdom". Instead of nominal wage flexibility,
what is needed is a flexibility in total labour costs by altering payroll taxes, thus
giving room for more predictable and stable developments in nominal wage, consumption and
The social partners -
with support from the government - managed to negotiate a national agreement on
EMU-buffers in the social insurance system. The buffers make it possible to level out
cyclical fluctuations and give time for real economic adjustment in case of severe
asymmetric shocks by altering employers payroll taxes (see also Calmfors, 1998). At the
same time the risk, that EMU leads to a weakening of the social security system, has been
Some employers saw the
common currency as a way to get rid of trade unions. But it was not that easy. The Finnish
buffer fund agreement in fact strengthens tripartite co-operation, the role of the social
partners and the tradition of centralised and incomes policy agreements, in force since
1) An earlier
version of this paper has been published in September 1998 in Bologna at the 11th World
Congress of the International Industrial Relations Association (IIRA) in Kauppinen (1998).
The EMU-buffers agreed
upon are not especially big, only about 7 billion FIM or 1 per cent of GNP. This amounts
to about 2 per cent of the total wage bill. If the lending facility in the unemployment
insurance system is includes, the buffers amount to about 10 billion FIM or 3 per cent of
the wage bill. They are thus big enough to level out pro-cyclical variations in the
Finnish employment pension and unemployment insurance systems.
In the case of mayor
external shocks they give more time for real adjustment. There is thereto a common
understanding between the social partners, that in case of severe economic disturbance, it
may be necessary to change legislation to allow the partial use of the normal pension
funds, now about 180 billion FIM.
EMU-buffer fund in the employment pension system will be, at maximum, about 2.5 per cent
of the wage bill in the private sector or about 3.5 billion FIM.
ceiling for the buffer fund in the unemployment insurance system is an amount equal to the
cost of an increase of unemployment of 3.6 percentage points, approximately 3 billion FIM,
but the system is allowed to lend an equal amount. Thus, unemployment might rise by 3.6
percentage points without requiring employers and workers unemployment
insurance contributions to be raised. Employers and workers contributions
finance only the income-related part of the system. The state budget functions as the
buffer for the basic, flat-rate unemployment insurance part of the unemployment costs.
these seemingly small buffers make it possibly temporarily to lover the private sector
employers payroll taxes by about 3 percentage points during two consecutive years. For the
public sector total wage costs can be lowered by about half of that.
Finland an "internal devaluation" where payroll taxes are cut by 3 - 4
percentage points gives the same employment effect (the trade balance effect is of course
not especially relevant in a currency union) as a 10 per cent currency devaluation,
according to Holm, Kiander and Tossavainen (1997), without adverse effects on inflation.
This model does not affect imports adversely as would a currency devaluation. Over the
cycle, payroll taxes will be raised again, to safeguard the social security system. Thus
this is not a "beggar thy neighbour"-policy or a start of a "race to the
added value of this system, compared to just making the automatic stabilisers of the
financial policy more effective, is the link to wage formation. When the payroll taxes are
increased in the good years, the risk for too high pay increases and wage-wage inflation
is lowered. Cutting pay-roll taxes during bad times gives room for better employment and
wage developments. It makes the social partners, employers and trade unions alike, more
aware of their responsibility for low inflation and employment.
Finnish experience shows that centralised agreements and national consensus is still a
strength. Different kinds of Social Contracts have in fact been quite common during recent
years in Western Europe, especially in smaller or peripheral countries, (Fajertag &
Pochet (1997), Pochet & Vanhercke (1998)). In December 1998 the Economic and Social
Committee of the EU proposed in an own-initiative opinion, that all EU member states
should create a system allowing grater total labour cost flexibility without nominal wage
flexibility and without endangering social security systems (ESC, 1998)
About Finland's economic history
monetary history since World War II has been one of cycles of inflation and currency
instability. All in all there have been eleven devaluation's, three revaluation's and one
period of floating. Finland's industrial structure, the heavy dependence on pulp and
paper, the trade patterns and also the cyclical rhythm differ from those of the
"core" EU-Member States. This, plus our location on the periphery of Europe,
makes Finland more exposed to external, asymmetrical shocks than most of the other
Finland has indeed experienced such shocks. Finland ran into a most severe economic crisis
in the beginning of the 1990´s. Unemployment rose from 3.5 per cent to almost 20 per cent
or 500 000 persons within a few years. The main reasons for this development were an
external shock - the collapse of the Soviet Union - and an uncontrolled deregulation of
Finland's financial markets in the late 80's. The Russian market accounted for almost a
quarter of Finland's total merchandise exports in the early 80´s. This market collapsed
in 1990 - 91.
The experience from the
late 80's stresses the need to make it absolutely sure, that the implications of changing
central economic relations are fully understood. The effects of the deregulation of the
financial markets in the 80's was not anticipated even by the Bank of Finland or the Bank
Inspection. This led to an financial bubble and the bank crisis, the cost of which is
about 10 billion ECU's for the Finnish tax payers.
In addition, the timing
of the monetary and exchange rate policies by the European Central Bank may make the
cyclical changes in Finland, which are out of phase with the "core" EU countries
even more volatile (see e.g. OECD, 1998). In contrast to the social partners in the core
EU-Member States, Finns cannot expect the European Central Bank to take Finland's special
problems into account in its monetary policy.
The composition of the
euro area has its own important consequences for Finland. Trade with UK, Denmark and
Sweden, all "outs", account for 24 per cent of Finland's total merchandise
export, whereas all the other EU-countries account for about 30 per cent.
flexibility does a common currency demand?
to textbook economics, the right thing to do when confronted with an external,
asymmetrical shock, is to devalue. As this is impossible within the EMU, what can be done?
The trade unions cannot, of course, support a Finnish participation in EMU if, as many
economists say, when the exchange rate is fixed, then employment and nominal wages must
fluctuate in response to external shocks, and that employers must retain the right
unilaterally to lower agreed wages. This would effectively destroy the negotiating
structures and bargaining systems.
The loss of important markets, a possible
"mad wood disease" or other unexpected problems must be anticipated. The right
thing to do cannot be to cut wages and domestic demand, which just would deepen the
crisis. According to the SAK analysis, the possible economic risks can be tackled - if
there is a social consensus to do so.
Employers and right wing
economists argue, that without the possibility of exchange rate realignment the only way
to react to external shocks is to accept a fall in agreed nominal wages or a rise in
unemployment. To make this possible, negotiating structures should be decentralised and
labour markets deregulated.
In particular, the
general applicability of collective agreements, i.e. the extension of the collective
agreements to bind also unorganised employers, was seen as an obstacle for the
"smooth" functioning of the labour market in the monetary union. Now we know,
that all participating countries have generally applicable collective agreements with only
one exception, Ireland (OECD (1997) p. 72). The three countries which left themselves
outside the common currency, i.e. UK, Denmark and Sweden , do not have generally
applicable collective agreements.
For the trade unions this
position was of course unacceptable. Cutting wages would in fact just add to the economic
difficulties, caused by external shocks, by cutting internal demand, tax revenues and
Normally, state budgets,
i.e. fiscal policy, are used as buffers. The Finnish Minister of Finance frequently
stated, that the only buffer needed with EMU is sound public finances. However, the strict
limitations agreed upon in the Stability and Growth Pact means, that fiscal policy alone
is an inadequate method for dealing with major economic disturbances.
From the employers side,
the economic situation of the firms, and especially sufficient own assets, has been
mentioned as the only buffer really needed.
Sound public finances are
of course important and so are sufficiently big own assets in the firm, but in the trade
union judgement, they are not enough.
lack of appropriate EU-level automatic stabilisers between nations participating in the
currency union, the Finnish Trade Unions in 1995 started to discuss national measures to
make economic adjustment easier within EMU. The new government's growing interest for
joining EMU also made the question more urgent to answer.
This forced SAK to discuss not
only whether or not EMU is a good thing for Europe but also to discuss the practical
solutions needed for tackling possible problems the day the third stage of EMU begins.
The Finnish trade union's
EMU-strategy has been to look for national labour market solutions which could help
stabilise the economy, protect the social security system and protect their members
whether employed or unemployed. SAK´s EMU-strategy has been to concentrate on such
national decisions which it can influence. As can be seen in Foden (1998), such a
pragmatic approach has not been especially common in Europe. But now the Finnish example
is discussed at least in Sweden, Ireland, Spain and Portugal.
The trade union debate
started in October 1995 at the SAK general assembly. In December 1995 the first SAK
discussion paper about national EMU-buffers was published.
In SAK's Congress, held
in June 1996, it was stated that SAK will oppose joining EMU if it is linked to demands
for the dismantling of the bargaining structures or nominal wage fluctuations. SAK also
demanded the development of buffer funds and the development of agreed rules for dealing
with economic disturbances.
In March 1997 SAK
launched nation-wide EMU-discussions and seminars for shop-stewards and other trade
unionists. SAK's positions and demands concerning EMU where supported by 9 shop stewards
out of ten.
SAK also managed to
deepen and broaden the debate. SAK 's demands were central for the work in the Incomes
Policy Commission and the negotiations on the Joint Opinion as well as for what questions
the Group of Professors looked at in their work.
function as buffers?
as in most EU-Member States, labour costs are considerably higher than the direct wage
costs, because of the so called non-wage labour costs or payroll taxes. The most important
of these are the employers' pension contributions which are equivalent to about 17 per
cent of the wage bill. Together with the other (statutory or by agreement) contributions,
they add some 30 per cent to the wage cost. This creates a possibility to influence the
total labour costs without touching the nominal wages at all. According to the latest
estimates (Holm et al, 1997) , the lowering of total labour costs by 3 - 4 per cent, an
"internal devaluation", gives the same employment advantages as a 10 per cent
exchange rate devaluation - without creating inflationary pressures - and time for real
adaptation to change.
In order not to endanger the social security
system's capabilities to meet future needs, if non-wage labour costs are actively used to
influence total labour costs, buffer funds must be established. In fact one already
exists. There is about FIM 180 billion ( ECU 32 billion) in the pension funds at present.
This is equivalent to about 30 per cent of GNP. SAK proposed that additional buffer funds
should be established.
In 1990, the unemployment
benefit contribution paid by employers was 0.6 per cent of total wages. In 1994 the figure
was 6.0 per cent as unemployment rose from 3.5 per cent to almost 20 per cent. If there
had been a buffer fund, the resulting increase in total labour costs, in the midst of the
most severe economic crisis in modern times in Finland, could have been softened and the
number of unemployed could have been about 50,000 lower.
Usually companies have no
time to train or re-train their personnel during the good times. And when the times change
and there is nothing but time, the companies have no money for training and education and
have to resort to compulsory redundancies. Would it not be better, to build buffer funds -
national, sector or even company based - to enable companies to take care of their
"most important asset" - their personnel and their personnel's skills, also
during the bad times? This proposal was not accepted by the employers.
These funds could, trade
unions proposed, be maintained outside the public sector and thus be used without
restricting the latitude for fiscal policy manoeuvring. Now it seems probable, that they
will be counted as part of the public sector in national accounts. But also if they are
counted as part of the public sector, greater public surpluses in the boom years as a
result of creating the EMU-buffers leaves more room for financial policy expansion in the
According to SAK,
external shocks can be softened by creating buffers and other "shock absorbers",
but there must be consensus concerning their use. The Government and the social partners
must agree on how to utilise them. They must also agree to build up the funds during the
good years so that there will be resources available when the bad times come.
and low inflation
difficulties are not the only aspect which must be taken into account when Finland joins
the EMU. The social partners stresses, that internally there must be a willingness to
adhere to the low inflation target. Wages and salaries are of course not the only factors
behind price increases, but they are by far the most important cost component in society.
How can the pay structure be
organised so that wage increases are compatible with the inflation target ? In a balanced
situation, real labour costs cannot rise by more than the average rate of labour
productivity without causing inflation, which ultimately causes unemployment.
Within a centralised wage
policy it is possible to agree upon a system, in which increased social security
contributions or other payroll taxes, paid by employers, keep wage demands lower, as a
response to the growing total labour costs. When the economic development decelerates, the
social security contributions paid by companies can be lowered in order to make companies
more competitive and help them maintain their workforce intact. Wage developments - and
the whole economy - will be more stable over the economic cycle.
from the Incomes Policy Commission
beginning of May 1997 the Incomes Policy Commission - established in 1971 and composed of
economists from the employers and trade union confederations and from the Ministry of
Finance - published a report on EMU and the labour market. The unanimous report states
that the national bargaining system has proved its capacity to tackle serious economic
difficulties and also managed to produce wage increases compatible with low inflation.
According to the report there is a
need to increase real economic stability - and not only monetary stability - especially in
the labour market. Incomes policy or centralised agreements lead to more predictability
and diminish fluctuations in wages, employment and consumption. According to the report
external shocks and severe cyclical fluctuations should - if Finland joins the EMU - be
met by a number of measures, from macroeconomic stabilisation policies, to measures aiming
at strengthening the capacity of an individual enterprise to meet downturns without need
to dismiss personnel. According to the Incomes Policy Commission different temporary
measures used to lower total costs of labour, might offer a functioning buffer against
major economic difficulties. This can be achieved by reducing e.g. the employers pension
or unemployment contributions, without lowering nominal or agreed wages and salaries. In
this way Finland can gain time for real adjustments in the economy, including real wage
adjustment, without over impeding employment possibilities.
This thinking is largely
based on the fact that the labour market is quite well organised - the trade union density
is over 80 per cent and the collective agreements are binding for almost the entire labour
market. Since 1968 wage settlements have mainly taken the form of centralised agreements
between employers and employee confederations or even tripartite incomes policy
agreements. There has been a tradition to look at total labour cost development, i.e. if
employers social insurance fees have been rising, nominal wage demands has been lowered
The wage model developed
by the Incomes Policy Commission in 1995 states, that the room for labour cost increase is
defined by the inflation target and the average productivity growth in the whole economy,
i.e. some 4 - 5 per cent per annum. But agreed nominal wage increases must reflect the
fact, that the wage drift will occupy part of the room for increase, on average about one
per cent during the 90's. Also rising employers social insurance fees will press down the
room for nominal increases. This model is thus a model for wage formation compatible with
low inflation, when the economy is in balance and the functional distribution of incomes
between wages and profits is kept unchanged.
Report from the Group of Professors
1997 the Group of Professors, which Prime Minister Lipponen announced at SAK:s General
Assembly in November 1996, in an attempt to react to SAK:s EMU-criticism, published its
final report. According to this report, the fears and uncertainties to which SAK drew
attention to, must be taken seriously.
The Group of Professors, chaired by Jukka
Pekkarinen, the Director of the Labour Institute for Economic Research, mainly focused on
the economic and employment effects of the two main alternatives: joining EMU as quickly
as possible, or staying outside with a floating exchange rate. The Group made no
recommendation either in favour of nor against joining EMU, but stressed, as had SAK, the
necessity to analyse and understand the changes in the rules of the game that both
alternatives will bring.
According to the report,
Finland has been, and will also in the future be, more exposed to external asymmetric
disturbances than most the other EU-member States. The report stressed the need to develop
more - not less - automatic stabilisers in the economy, but found the Stability Pact
problematic at least for countries like Finland.
The Group also looked at
the effects of a single currency for regional development in Finland, for gender equality
and for the future of social policy. These themes have rarely been touched upon during
present EMU-analyses in other countries.
Opinion of May, 1997
22nd, the social partners agreed on a 10-point paper, in which the starting point is that
"The European Union should co-operate in order to increase monetary stability;
encourage effective, long-term economic growth; improve the employment situation and
promote the construction of a Social Europe."
This joint opinion of the social partners,
concerning the effects of the Economic and Monetary Union on the functioning of the labour
market was signed by all the three trade union confederations, i.e. SAK, STTK and AKAVA,
and all five employers confederations, from both the private and public sectors. The
social partners stated that "The possible monetary union will not affect the basic
structure of Finnish labour markets". The joint opinion thus met one of the major
demands expressed during SAK's Congress in 1996.
In the joint opinion the
social partners also agreed to study SAK's proposals for EMU buffer funds, the other major
issue which SAK´s Congress demanded. This work started in June and continued till
The central labour market
organisations consider it important that the inflation objective of the European Central
Bank should be determined in such a way that it would not bring about deflation, and that
the necessary changes in relative wages can be implemented in practice and also, that the
specific conditions in Finland will be taken into account when applying the forthcoming EU
Stability and Growth Pact that restricts public sector deficits.
The Joint Opinion states,
that the tripartite co-operation, to which both the Government and social partners are
committed, will grow in importance and that Finland shall have a functioning system of
bargaining also in the future. And EMU-membership will not change the minimum requirements
of the collective agreements for both civil servants and workers, or change the universal
validity of collective labour agreements. Neither will it lower nominal wages.
Of particular importance
is the employers commitment to ensure that in their operations, alternative forms of
agreement including incomes policy and centralised agreements, will remain possible. The
organisations emphasise the importance of the possibilities offered by the Finnish
bargaining system in the conditions of the EMU.
In the Joint Opinion the
social partners once again commit themselves to low inflation, and state that adjusting to
a permanently low level of inflation is a central challenge to the bargaining system in
the conditions of the EMU, and that this is possible within the current bargaining
There is unanimity about
the need to increase the economy's resistance to disturbances i.a. by diversifying the
structure of the economy and by fiscal policy, within which the room to manoeuvre might
become more restricted by the EU Stability and Growth Pact. The financial solidity of
firms will facilitate their adjustment to economic fluctuations. The organisations state
that national, as well as branch- and company-level, stabilising buffers should be created
in order to prepare for economic disturbances. Useful buffers could be created in
connection with social insurance and in support of human resources development. Also the
organisation state that personnel funds and other profit-based components (Pepper schemes)
should promote the personnel's commitment to the operations of their workplace and reward
them according to the success of the company.
Fund Agreement, November 1997
lengthy discussions and negotiations, the social partners agreed in November 1997 to set
up two national EMU buffer funds which will stabilise the economy when Finland joins EMU.
The buffer funds in the pension insurance system and the unemployment insurance system
will make it possible to level out normal cyclical fluctuations. SAK's proposal to build a
fund for training and retraining was rejected by the employers. The agreement includes
also a common understanding on how to develop the national collective agreement system and
how to handle severe external shocks.
The agreement on the use of the employment pension
funds, unemployment insurance funds and personnel funds as counter-cyclical buffers was
reached. The deal on unemployment security is part of a wider framework where, in addition
to buffer funds, agreement was reached on the long-term principles for financing as well
as administrative reforms.
All eight labour market
central organisations signed the agreement, namely The Confederation of Unions for
Academic Professionals in Finland - AKAVA, The Church of Finland Negotiating Commission,
The Commission for Local Authority Employers - KT, The Employers' Confederation of Service
Industries - PT, The Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions - SAK, The Confederation
of Finnish Industry and Employers - TT, The Finnish Confederation of Salaried Employees -
STTK and the State Employers' Office - VTML.
The November agreement
establishes two national EMU-buffer funds. They are designed to be big enough to level out
normal cyclical fluctuations in the employers social security contributions. Thus the
stability and predictability of the economy will be increased. In the case of big external
shocks they give time to react and time for real adjustment.
Unemployment Insurance Fund
labour market organisations reached agreement on the principles by which the financing of
unemployment security will be safeguarded and fluctuations in the employers unemployment
insurance contributions will be smoothed. The solution does not change unemployment
allowances or the status of the trade unions' unemployment benefit funds.
On the basis of the decision, the
central government will contribute an amount to the financing of unemployment security
equivalent to the basic daily compensation starting in 1999 (in 1998 FIM 120 per day per
unemployed beneficiary). Some transitory arrangements are agreed not to increase the
governments expenditures immediately. The unemployment benefit funds will continue to
contribute to the financing of unemployment security an amount equal to 5.5 per cent of
their benefit expenditures.
A social partners' Common
Unemployment Insurance Fund will be established. Two thirds of the seats on the
administrative board of the fund are held by the employers and one-third by trade unions.
The Common Unemployment Insurance Fund will be responsible for the expenditures not
covered by the State or the unions unemployment benefit funds. The benefits cover
unemployment allowances, adult re-training programmes, voluntary education programmes for
the unemployed, compensation for persons on sabbatical leave, supplementary employment
pensions as well as the training and severance pay fund. The expenditures of the Common
Unemployment Insurance Fund are financed by employers' and employees' insurance
contributions and by the returns on investments. In 1998 the employer's contribution is
2,8 % of the wage sum and the employee's contribution is 1,4 % of wages/salaries. Starting
in 1999 the insurance contributions of employers and the obligatory contributions of
employees will be adjusted. In 1999 the contributions are 2.7 and 1.35 per cent
The Ministry of Social
Affairs and Health will set the level of insurance contributions on the basis of the
proposal of the Common Unemployment Insurance Fund.
In order to smoothen the
fluctuation in contributions stemming from economic developments, a counter-cyclical
buffer fund of about FIM 3 billion will be accumulated in the Common Unemployment
Insurance Fund. The buffer may be as big as the systems cost of an rise of unemployment by
3.6 percentage points. The state budget will act as a buffer for the basic unemployment
The buffer will be
collected when the decline in unemployment and benefit expenditures make it possible. The
target level was projected to be reached in the years 2002-2004. But according to the
latest estimates, the fund will grow by over 2 billion FIM in 1999. Under conditions of
economic disturbances the fund can also borrow to cover its expenditures. The agreement is
expected to buffer the unemployment benefit system not only from economic but also from
political fluctuations. Whether the fund will be counted in national accounts statistics
as part of the private or the public sector is still open.
Fund in the Employment Pension System
market organisations and the employment pension institutions, which in Finland are
private, have agreed upon the use of employment pension funds to smoothen cyclical
fluctuations in employment pension contributions. The aim is to use and expand the already
existing stabilisation fund. The purpose of the fund is to ensure the undisturbed payment
implementing the buffer scheme, the intention is to expand the stabilisation fund in line
with growth in the total wage sum in boom years. During a recession the stabilisation fund
would be allowed to decrease. This will reduce pressure to raise employment pension
contributions stemming from the slow growth or even a decrease in the wage sum. It is
estimated that the buffer necessary for smoothing ordinary cyclically related fluctuations
in the contributions would be about 2.5 per cent of the wage sum in the private sector,
i.e. about 3,5 billion FIM. In the end of 1999 this buffer fund will reach at least half
of that target, according to recent estimates.
The scheme will not
require any changes in legislation. The accumulation and depletion of the buffer fund will
be decided upon by the labour market organisations and the pension insurance institutions
in annual negotiations on employment pension contributions.
In the negotiations on
the buffer funds it was noted that in times of severe economic disturbances, it may be
necessary to impose changes in the legislation to allow use of the entire capital of the
employment pension fund, now about 180 billion FIM and to ease upward pressure on
employment pension contributions.
Recommendation on Personnel Funds and Results-based Pay
to the negotiating group that studied the use of personnel funds as EMU buffers, it is
important for all parties concerned to evaluate the effects of EMU on the functioning of
the labour market. The organisations note that the significance, for the enterprise and
for its personnel, of companies personnel funds and payment-by-results schemes must be
determined locally. It is also necessary to develop other forms of co-operation for
motivating personnel and promoting work incentives.
The organisations recommended that
firm-specific personnel funds and payment-by-results schemes must be negotiated locally.
It is also necessary to develop other forms of co-operation for motivating personnel and
promoting work incentives.
recognise that financially sound enterprises and firm-specific solutions facilitate the
adjustment to economic shocks and foster economic stability. The personnel funds in
companies and various kinds of payment-by-results schemes can function as buffers
smoothening fluctuations in profitability. When the profitability of enterprises is high,
part of the earnings can be channelled to employees via these schemes if desired.
The negotiating group
emphasised the importance of information. The organisations have jointly produced
information material for use by enterprises and personnel. The organisations will also
supply their member unions and member companies with information about the joint statement
by the end of this year. Information about personnel funds and payment-by-results schemes
will be intensified.
In the joint statement it
is noted that the ability of the economy to withstand cyclical disturbances can be
improved by, among other things, diversifying the industrial structure. Wage developments
compatible with steady low inflation will also foster economic stability.
November 1997 agreement on counter-cyclical buffers made it possible for all Trade Union
Confederations to support Finland joining the third stage of EMU from the beginning 1.1
1999, together with the majority of the EU member states. Also those parties in the
coalition government, which had been most critical towards EMU could thereafter accept
joining the euro. Finland's final decision, concerning participation in EMU, was made in
spring 1998 by the Finish Parliament.
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